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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

RONALD EASTHOPE,
Defendant-Appellant.

12739

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Ronald Dale Easthope, appeals from
convictions of the crimes of rape, robbery and sodomy
entered against him in the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty by a jury of rape,
robbery and sodomy on October 19, 1971, and sentenced
t.o the Utah State Prison for the term prescribed by law
for each conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
Third District Court should be affirmed.
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STATENIENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees basically with the facts as stated
by appellant except as hereinafter stated:
When Detectives Floyd Ledford and J olm Cameron
contacted Ronald Easthope on February 26, 1971, they
first gave him the complete Miranda warnings and ascer.
tained that he understood those warnings (R. 93, 105).
Appellant was then asked if he would be willing to stand
in a lineup, and he willingly agreed to do so (R. 94, 106).
Officer Ledford informed appellant that the same rights
under Miranda applied to the lineup, and specifically
that he had the right to have an attorney present during
the lineup, and that one would be furnished if he so desired (R. 94, 106). Appellant chose not to have an at·
tomey present at the lineup (R. 94, 106), and he fully
cooperated at the lineup proceedings later that evening
(R. 107).
After the lineup, and after his arrest, appellant was
handed a telephone directory to select a lawyer, but he
decided not to call one (R. 111). At that point, Mr.
Easthope initiated a new conversation by asking the basis
of his arrest, and he was told that he had been identified
in the lineup, whereupon appellant voluntarily replied,
"I didn't think anybody could identify me with a silk
stocking over my face" (R. 111, 112).
At trial, no objection was made by the defense as to
the admissibility of both the lineup identification and
the incriminatory remark made by appellant (R. 79, 111).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANT SHOULD BE PRECLUDED
FROM CONTESTING, ON APPEAL, THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION AND THE INCRIMINATORY
REivIARK MADE BY HIM, SINCE HE
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THEIR ADMISSIBILITY AT TRIAL.

It is a well-known principle of evidentiary law that
any objection to the admissibility of certain evidence
must be made when that evidence is offered, and the precise ground for that objection must also be stated at that
time. The trial record clearly reveals that no objection
was ever made by the defense as to the admissibility of
either the identification of Mr. Easthope during the lineup (R. 79), or the incriminatory remark he made after
his arrest that he "didn't think anybody could identify
[him] with a silk stocking over [his] face" (R. 111). We
submit that the rule expressed by this court in Pettingill
v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954), is controlling on this issue:
"Generally, appellate courts will not review
a ground of objection not urged in the trial court
. . . The duty is incumbent upon counsel to give
the trial court the opportunity to correct the error
before asking the appellate court to reverse a verdict and judgment thereon." Id. at 269, 186.
This Court was even more specific as to the procedure which should be followed to challenge the admissibil-
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ity of lincmp identifications under the Wade and Gilbert
decisions, infra:
"The proper way to raise a Wade objection
is by a
to suppress identification testimony
before trial. That procedure allows a suppression
hearing and a decision on the disputed evidence
before a jury is empaneled, and promotes an orderly and uninterrupted trial. A distinctly secondbest procedure is a defense motion to suppress
during trial. That procedure at least allows decision of the constitutional issue before fatally
prejudicial testimony comes before the jury (Cite
omitted).
"In the interest of orderly procedure defense
counsel should be admonished to seek an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of
identification testimony prior to trial. In the instant action, defense counsel made no objection
to the allegedly inadmissible testimony until the
prosecution had rested; he should have at least
made a motion to strike the testimony of any wit·
ness in violation of the Wade-Gilbert rules at the
conclusion of the witness' testimony." State v.
McGee, 24 Utah 2d 396, 400, 473 P. 2d 388 (1970).
In the present case, appellant failed to make any
objection to the admissibility of the aforementioned evi·
dence during the entire course of the trial, and such fail·
ure precludes him from raising his objections on this appeal. Nevertheless, should this court determine that
appellant's objections should be heard on appeal, the two
remammg points of this brief are submitted by respon·

dent.
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POINT II.
EVIDENCE OF THE IDENTIFICATION
MADE AT THE LINEUP WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED BY THE LOWER C 0 UR T
SINCE APPELLANT HAD MADE AN INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO
HA VE COUNSEL PRESENT AT THE LINEUP.
Appellant exclusively relies on two landmark United
States Supreme Court decisions (United States v. Wade,
388 U. S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S.
263 (1967)) to support his contention that his lineup
identification should have been excluded because he was
denied his right to counsel at the lineup. Respondent
submits that the Wade and Gilbert decisions are distinguishable and are not controlling here since Mr. Easthope intelligently waived his right to be represented by
counsel at the lineup.
The Court in Wade and Gilbert held that the lineup
is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution, and the
accused, therefore, has the right to counsel at the lineup.
However, the Court did not construe the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to mean that
counsel must be present at lineups, but merely that the
accused has the right to have counsel present. Thus, the
accused may either accept or waive his right to counsel.
This assertion was expressed in the Wade decision as
follows:
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" ... both Wade and his counsel should have
been notified of the impending lineup, and coun.
sel's presence should have been a requisite to conduct the lineup, absent an 'intelligent waiver.'"
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 237.
Justice Clark, in his concurring opinion, also emphasized
that counsel need not be present at a lineup where the
accused has made an effective waiver:
" ... the requirement of the presence of counsel arises, unless waived by the suspect." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 243.

It should further be noted that in both Wade and Gilbert,
the lineups occurred over two weeks after indictments had
been made, and after counsel had been appointed, and
the police failed to notify counsel of the lineup.

In the present case, the police officers initially gave
Mr. Easthope the complete Miranda warnings and ascertained that he understood those warnings (R. 93, 195).
Moments later, the possibility of a lineup was discussed,
and Officer Ledford repeated that the same rights under
Miranda applied to the lineup, and specifically stated
that Mr. Easthope had the right to have an attorney present at the lineup, and one would be provided for him if
he so desired (R. 94, 106). The Miranda warning could
not have been more explicit. Appellant replied that he
didn't have anything to hide and didn't need a lawyer
(R. 106). At no other time prior to or during the lineup
did appellant request an attorney. Respondent, there·
fore, submits that appellant was afforded every oppor·
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to the lineup,
and that he instead chose to waive his Wade-Gilbert right
to counsel.
tunity to seek a lawyer to accompany him

The remaining question is whether appellant's waiver
was made intelligently. The United States Supreme Court
in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506 (1962), squarely
dealt with the "intelligent waiver of counsel" issue and
held that:
"Presuming a waiver from a silent record is
impermissible. The record must show, or there
must be an allegation and evidence which show,
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
Anything less is not a waiver." Id. at 516.
Nowhere in appellant's brief does he offer any evidence to support his contention that his waiver was not
intelligently made. He instead relies solely upon his own
unsubstantiated, self-serving statement that such was the
case. The record in the instant case is not silent as to
circumstances surrounding appellant's waiver of counsel
at the lineup. Mr. Easthope had previously been given
complete Miranda warnings once, and it had been determined that he understood those warnings. He was
given the warnings again and was specifically told he
could have an attorney present at the lineup, and that
if he wished, an attorney could be provided for him. He
clearly and unequivocally replied that he did not want
an attorney (R. 106).
Respondent submits in conclusion that Mr. Easthope made an "intelligent" waiver of his right to counsel
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at the lineup, and that evidence of the lineup identifica.
tion was, therefore, properly admitted.

POINT III.
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT MADE IN
OFFICER ROGER'S PRESENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), held the following:
". . . the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory stemming from
cust.odial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrim·
ination . . . As for the procedural safeguards t.o be
employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of
silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evi·
dence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or ap·
pointed. The defendant may waive effectuatwn of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntar·
ily, knowingly and intelligently. If however, he in·
dicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
before speaking there can be no questwning."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 444-445.
Respondent submits that in the present case the above
safeguards were afforded Ronald Easthope,
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when he was in the custody of Officer Paul Rogers, and
that appellant voluntarily and knowingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination before making the incriminating statement L'l. question.
Officer Rogers arrested Mr. Easthope, carefully advised him of his constitutional rights, and ascertained
that he understood those rights. Appellant, then for the
first time, asked for an attorney. Officer Rogers immediately refrained from t:'.ny interrogation at that time due
to the admonishment in Miranda which reads:
" . . . Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear . . . If the individual
states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present." 384
u. s. 473-474.

At this point, instead of remaining silent, appellant, on
his own initiative, resumed conversation with Officer
Rogers by asking the basis for his arrest. The silence had
been voluntarily and knowingly broken by appellant, and
Officer Rogers therefore responded to the question of
replying that he (appellant) had been arrested because
he was identified in the lineup. No questions were asked
by the officer which might constitute interrogation, yet
appellant then voluntarily and knowingly made the following incriminatory remark: "I didn't think anybody
could identify me with a silk stocking over my face."
Clearly the above situation displayed a voluntary
desire on the part of appellant to speak, and Officer
Roger's response was hardly a continuance of police in-
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terrogation. His reply certainly was not interrogative in ,
nature since it lacked any focus or intent to incriminatt.
It was rather a good faith response to a question posed
by appellant. The California Court of Appeals, Second
District in People v. White, 275 Cal. 2d 877, ______ P. 2d
______ , 80 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1961) stated:
"We also recognize that there is no requirement in Miranda which compels police officers to
shut their ears or ref use to participate in general
conversation volunteered by a defendant ..." 80
Cal. Rptr. at 465.
Officer Rogers did nothing more than participate in con·
versation initiated and volunteered by Mr. Easthope.
Appellant nevertheless contends that since he had
previously requested an attorney his statement should
not have been admitted. In a sense, his argument implies
that Miranda prohibits his changing his mind to speak,
and that an accused deprives himself of his freedom of
choice and expression merely by initially invoking the
Fifth Amendment privilege. Such a result was never in·
tended in Miranda. After discussing interrogative problems created when an indigent accused requests counsel
and one cannot be immediately appointed (the exact situ·
ation in the present case), Chief Justice Warren, writing
the majority opinion in Miranda, stated the following:
"If the interrogation continues without the pres·
ence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a
heavy burden rests on the government to
strate that the defendant knowingly and intelh·
gently waived his privilege against self-incrimina-
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tion and his right to retained or appointed counsel." [Cite omitted.] See 384 U. S. at 475.
Just as a person is not estopped to invoke his privilege after an initial waiver, so the person should be able
to expressly retract his earlier claim of privilege and talk
to police. This is exactly what Mr. Easthope did, and his
statement was therefore properly admitted into evidence
by the lower court.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's
failure to timely raise any objections to the admissibility
of his lineup identification and his incriminatory remark
precludes him from raising such objections on appeal.
Secondly, since appellant intelligently waived his right
t0 have counsel at the lineup, the trial court properly
admitted the lineup identification. Finally, the incriminatory remark volunteered by appellant in the absence of
any police interrogation was properly admitted by the
lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

